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INTRODUCTION
The individual right to keep and bear arms is settled law for now.
In District of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court reconciled the
two clauses of the Second Amendment, reasoning that the
amendment protects an individual right of the people from whom the
militia is to be drawn. This comports with the centuries-old
understanding of the militia as the body of the people, who when
called for duty are expected to appear bearing arms provided by
themselves, in common use at the time.2 As for the boundaries on the
right to arms, the Court took an approach common for understanding
the Bill of Rights3—that the right to arms predated the Bill of Rights.

1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25. This common use standard is one of the primary
substantive contributions that the prefatory clause makes to our understanding of the
Second Amendment. A straightforward application of the common use standard
would resolve a variety of questions in a predictable way. See generally Nicholas J.
Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: Law, Politics, and Taxonomy, 50
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263 (2010) (discussing the demands and limits of the
common use standard). So far, lower courts interpreting Heller have not embraced
this straightforward application of the common use standard, and one notable
decision has rejected the idea that guns in common use cannot be banned. See Heller
v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (2011).
3. This is no novel assessment, as explained by Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissenting in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:
In drafting both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Framers strove
to create a form of Government decidedly different from their British
heritage. Whereas the British Parliament was unconstrained, the Framers
intended to create a Government of limited powers. See B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 182 (1967); 1 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 65 (H. Storing ed. 1981). The colonists
considered the British Government dangerously omnipotent. After all, the
British declaration of rights in 1688 had been enacted not by the people, but
by Parliament. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, p. 439 (M. Beloff ed., 1987).
Americans vehemently attacked the notion that rights were matters of
“‘favor and grace,’” given to the people from the Government. B. Bailyn,
supra, at 187 (quoting John Dickinson).
Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to “create” rights.
Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from
infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing. See, e.g., U.S.
Const., Amdt. 9 (“The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people”).
The Fourth Amendment, for example, does not create a new right of
security against unreasonable searches and seizures. It states that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” The
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So the stated purpose for the codification (facilitating the militia) did
not define the boundaries of the pre-existing right. The Court
discerned the American right to arms for self-defense rooted
significantly in the rights of Englishmen and the 1689 English Bill of
Rights.4 This approach reflects the “standard model” of Second
Amendment scholarship.5
Many still object to Heller and envision the day when it will be
overturned. Speaking at the Harvard Club of Washington, D.C. on
December 17, 2009, Justice Ginsburg expressed her hope that Justice
Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Heller will become the majority
opinion of a “future, wiser Court.”6 Writing for this Symposium,
Richard Aborn and Marlene Koury draw on Justice Ginsburg’s
criticism to imagine more precisely how the Court might overturn
Heller.7 Other critics of Heller who presumably would be happy to
see it overturned have included Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson,8 Judge

focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot
do, and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may be taken.
Bestowing rights and delineating protected groups would have been
inconsistent with the Drafters’ fundamental conception of a Bill of Rights as
a limitation on the Government’s conduct with respect to all whom it seeks
to govern. It is thus extremely unlikely that the Framers intended the
narrow construction of the term “the people” presented today by the
majority.
494 U.S. 259, 287-88 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
4. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592-94.
5. See Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62
TENN. L. REV. 461, 463 (1995) (adopting the term “standard model” to describe this
dominant theory of the Second Amendment).
6. David Kopel, Justice Ginsburg: Supreme Court May Eventually Overrule
Heller, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 20, 2009, 12:58 PM), http://volokh.com/
2009/12/20/justice-ginsburg-supreme-court-may-eventually-overrule-heller;
Chris
Cox, Michelle Obama’s Warning to Gun Owners, THE DAILY CALLER (Oct. 11, 2012,
9:41 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/11/michelle-obamas-warning-to-gun-owners.
7. See Richard Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A
Blueprint for Overturning District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1353 (2012). The Aborn & Koury article draws on Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), and their relationship to the cases they overturned, Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), and Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See id. It is interesting that Mr. Aborn and Ms.
Koury model their critique on cases that are famous for the controversial expansion
of individual rights and limitation of state power that infringed those rights. These
cases are hardly counterpoints to Heller. Indeed, as controversial affirmations of
individual rights, they fit comfortably in the same basket as Heller.
8. See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of
Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009).
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Richard Posner,9 and Richard Epstein.10 During the Symposium
proceedings, one historian chided that Heller is clearly wrong but is a
fun case to teach because it is so silly. More broadly, many others
who criticize Heller view our armed society as a profound collective
mistake or object that Heller upsets decades of lower court practice
and precedent.11
The majority opinion in Heller, as a guide to courts and as an
impetus for policy changes, naturally has received most of the
attention. But lurking in the background is the dissenters’ alternative
construction of the Second Amendment that critics implicitly contend
is a better, wiser, truer rendition of the right to keep and bear arms.
That construction is equally deserving of a critical assessment. That is
the intent of this Article.
I. EXPLAINING AWAY THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ARMS
VERSION 1.0: THE STATES’ RIGHTS SECOND AMENDMENT.
In their effort to explain away the Second Amendment, critics of
Heller fall into two broad categories. The first group consists of
people who have glancing familiarity with the cases but have not
studied them. These critics would describe the Second Amendment
as a kind of federalism provision that only protects the states’ right to
maintain or arm state militias. This states’ rights view was a
prominent part of the jurisprudence of the lower federal courts from
the 1940s through 2008. The Third Circuit confidently articulated this
view in United States. v. Tot,12 one of the first lower court cases
claiming to apply the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in United States
v. Miller.13 Citing nothing but Miller, the Tot court declared:
It is abundantly clear both from the discussions of this amendment
contemporaneous with its proposal and adoption and those of
learned writers since that this amendment, unlike those providing
for protection of free speech and freedom of religion, was not

9. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and
Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32.
10. See Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian Gun Fallacy, DEFINING IDEAS (Jan.
31, 2012), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/106796.
11. See, e.g., Michael B. de Leeuw, Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v.
Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER LAW J. 133, 142-48
(2009); William G. Merkle, Heller as Hubris, and How McDonald v. City of Chicago
May Well Change the Constitutional World As We Know It, 50 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1221, 1225 n.15 (2010).
12. 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942), rev’d on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
13. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for the
states in the maintenance of their militia organizations against
possible encroachments by the federal power.14
Over the years, scores of cases and nearly every Circuit Court of
Appeals cited Tot.15 Many casual critics of Heller still embrace the
Tot approach.16 These critics generally will not have studied the
opinions in Heller, because if they had, they would realize that the
states’ rights view of the Second Amendment—that staple of popular
objection to the individual right—is neither advanced nor defended
by any of the nine Justices in Heller. Neither Justice Breyer nor
Justice Stevens adopts it in dissent. This surprises some of the glib
Heller critics and leaves them doctrinally out of sync with their
ideological cohorts.
Richard Epstein, for example, opined in January 2012 that the
Heller majority is wrong, arguing that, “[t]he point of the amendment
is to deal with the interactions between the federal government and
the states in ways that leave the states free and clear of federal
oversight on their own internal regulation of the use of firearms.”17
This is a fairly standard articulation of the states’ rights Second
Amendment, reflecting essentially the position that the Court took in
Tot.
Epstein advances what I sense is a fairly widespread view among
casual Heller skeptics, who embrace the states’ rights view, perhaps
not even appreciating that the Heller dissenters have replaced it with
another alternative reading of the Second Amendment.

II. EXPLAINING AWAY THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ARMS
VERSION 2.0: JUSTICE STEVENS’S “INDIVIDUAL MILITIA RIGHT”
One cannot know with certainty why the Heller dissenters
jettisoned the states’ rights interpretation of the Second Amendment.
The linguistic difficulty of transforming a right of the “people” into a

14. 131 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, n.22 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764, 772
(8th Cir. 1971); Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F. Supp. 2d 919, 939 (E.D. Pa. 2002);
Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (E.D. Cal.
1990).
16. I have discussed Heller and the Second Amendment at a variety of events
since 2008. This has generated more conversations about the opinion than I can
count. In my experience, a majority of the people who think Heller is wrong contend
that the Second Amendment just protects state militias.
17. Epstein, supra note 10.
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right of the “states” was always an obvious problem for the states’
rights view, but the lower federal courts embraced it nonetheless.18
The likely answer is that reading the “right of the people” as a right of
the “states” seemed doubly implausible after the Court concluded in
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez19 that “people” was a term of art
in the Constitution referring to “a class of persons who are part of a
national community.”20
To a significant degree, the Heller dissenters seem to have adopted
the post-Verdugo response of the opposition to the Standard Model.
After Verdugo, the states’ rights view seemed increasingly
vulnerable.21 Out of this worry emerged the individual militia right
that Stevens advances. This theory is rooted in early work by Dennis
Hennigan of Handgun Control Inc.,22 and pressed aggressively with
regard to Heller by historians like Saul Cornell, a participant in this
panel.23 Justice Stevens’s conception of the Second Amendment cites
and is evidently grounded in this body of work.24 So how precisely
does Stevens frame the Second Amendment right and is his
construction, as Heller skeptics would contend, a plainly better, more
plausible reading?
At the outset, Stevens dispenses with the idea that the Second
Amendment does not protect an individual right. He then frames in

18. See, e.g., United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942), and the scores of
cases citing it. See also Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971)
(“Since the Second Amendment right ‘to keep and bear arms’ applies only to the
right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to bear arms,
there can be no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to
possess a firearm.”).
19. 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
20. The states’ rights argument filled the gap left by rejecting the individual right
with a plausible “militia right.” This at least masked the fundamental incoherence of
thinking about “militia as right” in the individual context. Some objected that the
characterization was flawed because in our constitution states compete with the
federal government over powers. But this objection notwithstanding, in the statefederal contest over authority, it was not absurd to talk about a state militia right.
21. See JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT 446–47
(2012).
22. Dennis A. Henigan & Keith A. Ehrman, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5
(1989).
23. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model,

The Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENT 221 (1999).
24. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 685 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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general terms a view of the Second Amendment that protects a
relatively narrow individual militia right.
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second
Amendment protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.”
Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals. But a
conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right
does not tell us anything about the scope of that right.
....
[Whether the Second Amendment] protects the right to possess and
use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal selfdefense is the question presented by this case. The text of the
Amendment, its history and our decision in United States v.
Miller . . . provide a clear answer to that question.
....
The view of the Amendment we took in Miller—that it protects the
right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes but that it
does not curtail the Legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary
use and ownership of weapons—is both the most natural reading of
the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the
history of its adoption.25

It is useful to pause here try to imagine exactly what this individual
“right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes” actually
means.26
Consider, for contrast, the challenge of envisioning
constitutional rights. One can quite easily imagine the core interests
protected by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights (including the
Heller majority’s conception of the Second Amendment) and
countless variations and permutations.
In comparison, Stevens’s individual militia right is strangely
incoherent. It is nearly impossible to imagine a scenario that triggers
it. The majority captures the problem this way: “[I]f petitioners are
correct, the Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun
in an organization from which Congress has plenary authority to
25. Id. at 636-38 (emphasis added). As an aside, Stevens is clearly wrong in his
assertion about the meaning of Miller. That case focused on whether the weapon in
question (a sawed-off shotgun) was protected under the Second Amendment. United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939). Nothing in the decision stands for the
conclusion that Stevens claims.
26. Cf., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) (“Since the
Second Amendment right ‘to keep and bear [a]rms’ applies only to the right of the
State to maintain a militia and not to the individual’s right to bear arms, there can be
no serious claim to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a
firearm.”).
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exclude them.”27 In another permutation, Justice Scalia chides that
the formulation is “worthy of the mad hatter”.28
This assessment is underscored by the effort to give content to
Stevens’s individual militia right. Take a few minutes—or a few days.
Try to come up with a list of illustrations of the individual militia right
in action. Compare that list to what you come up with for the First,
Fourth, Fifth, or any of the other Amendments. My experience
suggests you will end up with fundamentally different types of lists.
In the years since Heller, I have asked my seminar students for their
views of precisely what the Stevens version of the Second
Amendment might mean in operation. It turns out that this is a hard
question to answer.29
The casual effort to give concrete meaning to Stevens’s individual
militia right renders absurdities. Do you have a right to be in the
militia even where the state rejects you? Once you are in militia
service, are you entitled to bear arms, even where you are ordered to
peel potatoes? Are you entitled to bear the arm of your choice, or
your personal favorite gun, even where you are ordered to keep or
bear something else or nothing? Can you demand that the state call
out, muster, and drill the militia even where the authorities have
decided against it and prevail in a lawsuit to enforce your demand?30
Are we really to believe that the extraordinary machinery of
constitutional amendment was deployed for something so amorphous,
fleeting and, frankly, nonsensical as this? One wonders whether
Stevens is serious. Why is it so difficult to imagine, either today or in
the eighteenth century, scenarios that give content to Stevens’s
individual militia right?
27. Heller, 554 U.S. at 600. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights
and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993) (arguing that
constitutional rights are conceptually distinguishable from corresponding government
power).
28. Heller, 554 U.S. at 589; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 n.16 (“Contrary to
Justice Stevens’s wholly unsupported assertion, there was no pre-existing right in
English law ‘to use weapons for certain military purposes’ or to use arms in an
organized militia.” (citation omitted)).
29. The individual right to arms as conceived by the Heller majority, on the other
hand, generates a host of concrete examples that pose the traditional problems of
scope that we engage when talking about rights. Stevens’s individual militia right, in
comparison, simply does not behave like a right.
30. These absurdities represent the first wave of examples one would imagine
without resorting to some sleight of hand that would render the Second Amendment
just some kind of standing rule in cases we are left to imagine. I wager that your
examples of the individual militia right in action, while they may be different in detail
from what I have sketched, are very similar in flavor—filled only with trifles.
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The answer is this: for individuals, the militia is a duty, not a right.31
And the difference is quite clear. Rights are things we can insist
upon. Duties are things that can be demanded of us. This is why
examples of the “individual militia right” seem patently absurd. But
that is where Stevens’s formulation pushes us.
Compare the otherwise fatally flawed32 states’ rights view of the
Second Amendment articulated in Tot.33 Under that view, the
Second Amendment only protects the states’ right to maintain a
militia.34 What does such a right mean? One could plausibly answer
that it means states could maintain their own militias, notwithstanding
the potential limitation of Article I, Section 8, or Article I, Section 10
of the Constitution, and could not be prohibited from doing so by the
exercise of federal power.35 This is a function in which the states can
engage and have engaged (although more accurately through an
exercise of power rather than rights). The glaring flaw of this view
was that it wrenched “right of the people” into a right of states. But
at least the imagery is coherent.
Stevens’s individual militia right, in contrast, cannot really be
envisioned as a right to maintain a militia.36 If anything, it seems
more plausibly cast as a right to keep and bear arms in, as part of, or
in connection to the militia—or in Stevens’s words, “for certain
military purposes.”37
31. It was flawed, but plausible, to talk about the state right to have a militia (both
federal and state governments can and have had militias). But once it is conceded
that the Second Amendment establishes an individual right, the difference between
the individual right to arms and the militia duty becomes plain.
32. Its fatal flaw was that it required us to believe “right of the people” meant
“right of the states,” even though the Constitution clearly distinguishes between
people and states throughout. Indeed, the Court has determined that “people” is a
constitutional term of art referring to individual members of the polity. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. This masked the fundamental incoherence of thinking about the militia as a
right in the individual context. Some objected that the characterization was flawed
because in our Constitution, states compete with the federal government over
powers. But this objection notwithstanding, in the state-federal contest over
authority, at least it was plausible to envision a state militia right.
35. Article I, Section 10 also prohibits states from maintaining troops without the
consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
36. That would seem to sanction a solitary militia—a constitutionally authorized
army of one. The implications of this idea seem far beyond Stevens’s manifest intent.
37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. Another possibility is that it gives individuals a right
to possess a broad range of militia weapons. But that view seems even more at odds
with Stevens’s overall effort. So while it is in some ways revealing to pursue this
possibility, it is also distracting.
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But even this construction defies reality. The militia is and always
has been a duty, not a right. For those who object to my elaboration
of Stevens’s formulation, I invite any more favorable construction you
desire.38 The only parameter is the acknowledgement that rights
constrain the state, rather than carry state commands.39 So what does
it mean for an individual to assert a right that constrains the state in
the context of a militia or military over which the state exercises
plenary authority?
By failing to appreciate the fundamental distinction between
militia as a duty and arms as a right, Stevens renders an empty and
incoherent version of the Second Amendment. One imagines that he
intended empty, but not incoherent. In an effort to neuter the right
to arms, Stevens offers one that fails even as a plausible placeholder
for the rejected individual right—a fundamental constitutional right
virtually impossible to imagine in operation.
While much is made in this debate about changed circumstances,
Stevens’s formulation is incoherent even from a historical
perspective. Yes, there was plenty of talk about the militia during the
latter part of the eighteenth century. But that discussion simply
confirms the point. Militia connoted duty, not right. As shown in the
next section, the illustrations are countless. Militiamen could be
required to possess certain arms and accoutrements. They could be
required to enroll. Required to appear. Required to muster.
Required to march out, with controversies over how far and for how
long. Militiamen could be required to take commands and submit to

38. Saul Cornell, for example, attempts to finesse this distinction. Cornell argues
that many eighteenth century Americans
understood liberty in terms rather different than those of modern liberal
rights-based constitutional theories. Indeed, it is important to recall that the
right of gun ownership was connected with an obligation of militia service.
Governments could not only compel attendance at militia musters, but the
failure to comply could result in fines. In general, modern rights are not
subject to these sorts of restrictions and seldom carry with them these types
of obligations.
Cornell, supra note 23, at 237. His illustrations of duty are clear. The question
remains, what, if anything, does his view of the right involve?
39. Some may object that claims of a right to vote or to serve on a jury complicate
this parameter. But this actually underscores Justice Scalia’s plenary power criticism.
Congress cannot abolish elections or juries. In contrast, Article I, Section 8 allows
Congress to do exactly that for the militia, rendering the supposed individual militia
right entirely hollow. This is also another way of confirming the accuracy of Heller’s
assessment of the militia prefatory clause. The prefatory clause describes the reason
for codification of the individual right to arms. But nothing in the prefatory clause
mandates a militia or guarantees any right to serve in a militia.

JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RIGHTS VERSUS DUTIES

2/14/2013 4:09 PM

1513

military discipline. They could be required to risk and even sacrifice
their lives in service of the state. In all these ways, militiamen
performed civic duties and were subject to penalties if they refused.
But it is nonsense to cast these duties as rights.
III. REDEEMING VERSION 2.0: A SUBSTANTIVE INDIVIDUAL
MILITIA R IGHT?
Those who have fully engaged with my invitation to imagine a
substantive individual militia right eventually will discern a narrow set
of circumstances where Stevens’s formulation might render
something recognizable as a right. Perhaps the individual militia right
is some kind of individual right to shoot, to train, or to gather for
shooting practice or other activity with their individual arms that
approximates or facilitates the militia duty.40
This individual militia right would be a slim right, compared to the
prevailing view in Heller, and ironically it might have implications for
protected arms and activity (e.g., a right to own and shoot “assault
rifles”) that Justice Stevens and others would find more troubling
than the prevailing view in Heller.41 But it would be a concrete,
identifiable right rather than an obligation—an exercise of individual
sovereignty that would constrain the state in the way that rights do.
We do not know if this interpretation is what Justice Stevens had in
mind, but it is telling that one of the more active proponents of the
“individual militia right” emphatically rejects this idea. Patrick
Charles, a participant in this program, whose “research was the basis
of the English Historians’ Amici Curiae brief in McDonald v. City of
Chicago . . . [and was] cited by Justice Breyer in the McDonald

40. This sort of right could even co-exist smoothly with the individual right
anticipated by the Heller majority. But one guesses Stevens would reject that view.
41. For example, one could plausibly argue that assault rifles, or at least military
or military style guns like the M1 Garand (long sold by the federal government to
rifle clubs through the Civilian Marksmanship Program) or the AR-15
(semiautomatic version of the military M-16) were constitutionally protected arms
under this view. Even restricting the right just to the keeping of guns, such a view
would seem to privilege private possession of guns like those that have for now been
legitimately banned by legislation that the D.C. Circuit says is consistent with the
majority opinion in Heller. Again, one imagines that Justice Stevens was not really
trying to construct an individual right protecting semiautomatic assault rifles. See also
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 21, at 27-36 (showing state right to arms provisions
guaranteeing, for example, that “[e]very citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of
himself and the state” (citing CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, §17)). Within such
provisions, there is a range of true individual rights independent of any duty owed to
the state.
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dissent,”42 contends that the “individual militia right”43 establishes no
rights outside the context of formal participation in the state
sanctioned militia.44
Charles responds to an argument raised in the litigation following
McDonald v. Chicago that Chicago’s refusal to license shooting
ranges violated a Second Amendment right to gather and train and
shoot. In an article entitled The 1792 National Militia Act, the

Second Amendment and Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and
Historical Perspective,45 Charles contends that this argument is flatly
wrong.46 The “individual militia right,” he insists, only attaches after
the state has invoked its militia power and actually called an
individual into service.47
Charles’s arguments offer a vivid example of the mistake at the
core of Stevens’s dissent. Following theorists like Charles and
historians who fail to distinguish between duty and right, Stevens and
other critics of Heller plunge into a formulation of the individual right
to arms that is a carbon copy of militia duty.
The incoherence of the so called “individual militia right” is
illustrated by Charles’s various proposed historical examples of its
operation and boundaries. He asserts that the scope of this right can
be understood by reference to the text, operation, and legislative
history of the 1792 Militia Act.48 The problem throughout is that his
illustrations of the “individual militia right” in action are quite clearly
duties that, when cast as rights, are just nonsense.
Core examples of the “individual militia right” in operation would
require us to believe that one can be penalized for failing to exercise a
right. Charles explains that, “[t]he First and Second Congresses
respected the States’ authority to ‘arm’ the militia, giving them
latitude to establish the rules, penalties, and fines by which
42. Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment
and Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 323, 323 n.* (2011).
43. The Article, as the title demonstrates, attempts to elaborate on the content of
the individual militia right, or, more accurately, to show that the right does not mean
individuals may gather and train and shoot in a way that would approximate
something useful to the common defense. Id. at 380.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 323.
46. “The argument that the people have an independent right to associate as
militias fails, however, when comparing it to the actual text of the 1792 National
Militia Act.” Id. at 380.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 328.
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individuals were to have arms.”49 Penalties attached for a variety of
infractions. For example, the state could demand a “uniformity of
arms”—e.g., that “all muskets . . . be bores [sic] sufficient for balls of
the eighteenth part of a pound.”50 So here, the supposed “individual
militia right” would subject citizens to penalties for failure to
purchase and maintain the type of arms and ammunition dictated by
the state. This of course is a state command, backed by the threat of
penalties. It is not a right.51
Recall Charles’s flat dismissal of the idea that the “individual
militia right” could be exercised outside of formal militia service.
One of his basic examples of the “individual militia right” supposedly
in operation focuses on the transition that occurs when citizens enter
militia service: “‘[W]hen a man assumes a Soldier, he lays aside the
Citizen, & must be content to submit to a temporary relinquishment
of some of his civil [r]ights.’ Martial law and military discipline were
of particular importance, for without both the men where nothing but
an ‘armed Rabble.’”52 Again, this elaboration of the supposed
“individual militia right” shows that it is no right at all. Rather, the
illustration shows that upon entering militia service, one is obligated
to surrender a variety of rights, and might be required to risk and
even sacrifice his life.
Charles purports to illuminate the “individual militia right” by
referencing the Militia Act debate over age qualification. There were
proposals for “including ‘every man between 16 and 60, 65 or 70’”
years of age, and on reconsideration the qualifying age range was
settled at 18 to 45.53 Charles thinks this state control over admission
to the militia helps to define the scope of the “individual militia
right.”54 But the mistake is plain. While this kind of filter on
participation is consistent, as Scalia notes, with an organization over
which the state has plenary authority, it is plainly incompatible with
any conception of rights. It is a strange right indeed that can be

49. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 333 (quoting Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271, 272 (1792) (repealed
1903)).
51. See id. at 332-33.
52. Id. at 335 (citing 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION, 1774-76, ser. 4, at 1164 (Peter Force, ed., 1833-46); 5 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN ADAMS 13 (Robert J. Taylor, ed., 1833-46)).
53. Charles, supra note 42, at 336 (quoting House of Representatives, On the
Militia Bill, Dec. 23, 1790, reprinted in FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER,
Jan. 3, 1791, at 2).
54. See id.
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limited under the state’s full discretion to exclude the 46 year old, no
matter how fit, or the 17 year old, no matter how mature, the 25 year
old who happens to be gay, or anyone else, for that matter, as state
agents see fit.
Charles’s citations to the legislative history of the Militia Act are
similarly telling. The legislative record he invokes shows that the
drafters of the Militia Act certainly appreciated that they were
discussing duties rather than rights. In two central illustrative
paragraphs, Charles’s elaborations of the “individual militia right” are
entirely about duty. He starts with a quote from Hugh Williamson,
who declares, “‘[E]very man must do his share of the duty, imposed
by the civil compact,’ since maintaining ‘our liberties and properties’
requires an ‘efficient militia.’”55 Representative A. Michael Stone
concurs, “[E]very man who has joined our government is bound to
the performance of militia duty.”56 Representative William Giles
said, “[T]he purpose of the militia bill ‘was to make the law so general
as to operate on all the citizens of the union, within a certain
description of age and constitution, and oblige them to render their
personal services.’”57 Charles invokes these statements as framing the
“individual militia right,” but each and every statement is, quite
clearly, an articulation of duty.
Charles argues that the broad, final content of the Militia Act also
defines the “individual militia right.” But as purported illustrations of
an individual right, the examples he cites are nonsense. The act posed
“(1) fines on persons that did not provide the proper arms and
accoutrements, (2) exemptions for poor persons, and (3) exemptions
for persons scrupulous to arms bearing.”58 All of these plainly
delineate, and limit, obligations on which the state could insist. The
provisions for enforcing these obligations underscore the absurdity of
casting these commands as rights. Charles would have us believe that
the person subjected to fines for failure to comply is actually
exercising his constitutionally protected “individual militia right.”

55. Id. at 338 (quoting House of Representatives, On the Militia Bill, Dec. 1, 1790,
reprinted in N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Jan. 3, 1791, at 2) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 339 (quoting House of Representatives, On the Militia Bill, Dec. 24,
1790, reprinted in FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 10, 1791, at 2)
(emphasis added).
57. Id. (quoting House of Representatives, On the Militia Bill, Dec. 16, 1790,
reprinted in N.Y. J. & PATRIOTIC REG., Jan. 13, 1791, at 1) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 341.
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Charles’ other purported elaborations of the “individual militia
right” in operation exhibit the same problem:
[Those] who shall neglect to appear, when warned pursuant to law,
at the company meeting or rendezvous, not having a sufficient
excuse, shall forfeit and pay the sum of fifty cents; and for
appearing . . . without arms . . . shall pay the sum of twenty-five
cents; and for the like offences at a . . . meeting or rendezvous . . .
shall forfeit and pay the sum of one hundred cents . . . .59

The theme of duty continues in the examples that Charles draws
from the rules that govern those exempt from the militia duty. Those
“exempted from personal service in the militia . . . shall pay an annual
tax of two dollars into the public treasury of the United States, to be
applied towards the support of the civil government thereof . . . .”60
Whether in the eighteenth or the twenty-first century, the idea of a
right that subjects one to a civil fine is hard to fathom. But the
individual militia right, we are told, is manifest in fines levied by both
the federal and state governments. “[U]pon Congress enacting the
National Militia Act, most States amended their militia laws by
assessing fines. While some States assessed fines for non-compliance,
[others] made exemptions for persons unable to afford the requisite
arms.”61
The individual militia right also evidently includes an enforceable
demand to appear, as illustrated by Charles’s invocation of the initial
introduction of the Militia Act: “[E]ach company of the militia . . .
shall rendezvous four times in every year.”62 This is easily understood
as a command. As a right, it is nonsense.
From these examples, it should be no surprise that Charles’s
general formulation of the “individual militia right” defies efforts to
extract anything exhibiting the characteristics of a substantive
individual right that would limit government power in any way.
Witness his general distillation of the “individual militia right”:

59. Id. (quoting A Bill More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense, by
Establishing a Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, reprinted in MD.
GAZETTE (Frederick, Md.), Aug. 5, 1790, at 2) (emphasis added).
60. Id. (quoting A Bill More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense, by
Establishing a Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, reprinted in MD.
GAZETTE (Frederick, Md.), Aug. 5, 1790, at 3) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 344.
62. Id. (quoting A Bill More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense, by
Establishing a Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, reprinted in MD.
GAZETTE (Frederick, Md.), July 29, 1790, at 1) (emphasis added).
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[A]ny militia rights to ‘keep and bear arms’ are only individualized
as to participating in the national defense and provide constitutional
balance. While this right to take part in defending our liberties may
strike us as odd today, the right was the very essence of ‘keeping and
bearing arms’ as a militiaman.63

He further explains that the individual militia right “articulat[es]
the fact that individual citizens capable of performing militia service
had a right to take part in defending their liberties.”64 In the details,
however, it is clear that this conception of the individual right would
not limit government one whit and is unrecognizable as an individual
right.
Indeed, even those citizens nominally within the state’s arbitrary
age range for militia service are still subject to the state’s
discretionary assessment of their fitness. Charles explains that
ultimately the “individual militia right” only applies to those “able to
withstand the physical rigors of militia service, subject one self [sic] to
military discipline, support just government, and willfully adhere to
the call to arms.”65
As we have seen, this “right” also permits individuals to be fined
for not appearing and requires that they surrender other civil
liberties, subjecting them to full authority of the state, including the
obligation to risk and even surrender their lives in combat. This is a
prosaic description of civic duty. But it is preposterous to call these
things rights.
IV. JUSTICE STEVENS CONCURS?
Patrick Charles’s elaborations of the “individual militia right” track
the signals Justice Stevens provides in his Heller dissent. Explaining
the meaning of the right to “keep” arms, Stevens, like Charles,
exhibits the confusion of duty and right. The right to “keep” arms he
says is explained, for example, by
the requirement that militia members store their arms at their
homes, ready to be used for service when necessary. The Virginia
military law, for example, ordered that “every one of the said
officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall constantly

63. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 367.
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keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements and ammunition, ready to
be produced whenever called for by his commanding officer.”66

Tellingly, Stevens summarizes the evidence this way: “‘[K]eep and
bear arms’ thus perfectly describes the responsibilities of a framingera militia member.”67 Stevens weaves a stingy, irrelevant right from
things that can only be understood as duties. He asks us to embrace a
bizarre conception of the right to keep and bear arms that produces
only “requirements” and “responsibilities” and empowers commands
about what one “shall” do. This is a fine articulation of the militia
duty. But it is a farcical articulation of rights.
In an accompanying footnote, Stevens identifies New Jersey,
Delaware, and Connecticut laws that demand that a militiaman “shall
also keep in his Place of Abode one [p]ound of [g]unpowder and
three [p]ounds of [b]all; . . . shall at his own expense, provide himself
with a musket or firelock . . . all in good order . . . under the penalty of
forty shillings.”68 These examples are full of commands. They
accurately reflect common militia duties, but as elaborations or
examples of rights, they are nonsense.
While historians, unburdened by the pervasive legal distinction
between rights and duties, might be forgiven the attempt to pass off a
right filled only with duties, Stevens ultimately seems to recognize the
dilemma and attempts, rhetorically, to reconcile the conflict. His
tactic is brute force.
Stevens rejects the majority’s understanding of the duality within
the Second Amendment (a militia prefatory clause stating the reason
for codification and a pre-existing individual right that facilitates the
militia duty). While he is plainly wrong, his analysis illuminates his
confusion of rights and duties. The right to keep and bear arms, he
says, “protects only one right, rather than two. . . . [T]he single right

that it does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms available
and ready for military service, and to use them for military purposes
when necessary.”69
66. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 650 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Act for Regulating and Disciplining the Militia, 1785 Va. Acts
ch. 1, § 3, p. 2) (emphasis added).
67. Id. at 650-51 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 590 n.12 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 651 (emphasis added). Taken literally, this suggests an individual right
to keep military weapons in the home. Perhaps Stevens really does mean that
individuals have “a right to have arms available and ready for military service.” Id.
On the other hand, this view is plainly rejected by theorists like Charles whom
Stevens appears to channel. See also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 633–34
(1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens’s dissent in Staples evinces his view that
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Here, Stevens implicitly acknowledges that his illustrations of the
individual militia right are not rights at all, but instead examples of
duty. This nod to the difference between duties and rights does not
slow him down. Two sentences later, he simply collapses the two
ideas in a way that emphasizes his analytical error. He summarizes
the Second Amendment command this way: “When each word in the
text is given full effect, the Amendment is most naturally read to
secure to the people a right to use and possess arms in conjunction
with service in a well regulated militia.” 70
So with a fleeting rhetorical nod to the obvious difference between
rights and duties two sentences earlier, Stevens summarizes by
collapsing right and duty, to render a “right” that contains no
personal autonomy, no limitations on the state, and is filled only with
obligations (including risk of life and limb) enforceable by the state
through fines and punishments.
Later in the opinion, Stevens repeats the confusion between right
and duty. Again, he perfunctorily acknowledges that his examples
only describe duties, but in another exercise of brute force, blithely
claims that the boundaries of militia service fully delineate both duty
Referencing Madison’s first draft of the Second
and right.
Amendment (which included a provision that no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military
service in person), Stevens argues “[i]t confirms an intent to describe
a duty as well as a right, and it unequivocally identifies the military
character of both.”71
Another telling instance of Stevens’s confusion of duties with rights
appears in his assessment of proposals from North Carolina and
Virginia providing “that any person religiously scrupulous of bearing
arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to
employ another to bear arms in his stead.”72 Stevens argues that such
a provision shows a plain military context, emphasizing that “[t]he
State simply does not compel its citizens to carry arms for the purpose
of private ‘confrontation,’ or for self-defense.”73 And this, ironically,
underscores his continuing mistake. Because the far more telling

military-grade weapons are especially dangerous and are properly subject to stringent
regulation under the National Firearms Act that prevents most people from owning
them.
70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 660.
72. Id. at 661 (emphasis omitted).
73. Id.
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thing is that the state does not “compel” its citizens to exercise
individual rights. The state certainly may enforce militia duties by
compulsion. But neither that fact, nor the endless repetition of it, can
transform a militia duty into a coherent, substantive “individual
militia right.”
Beyond the boundaries of Stevens’s dissent, the incoherence of the
“individual militia right” is underscored when we extend the
confusion of rights and duties to familiar places. The freedom to
worship becomes a duty to worship. The freedom of assembly
becomes the duty to assemble. The right to the ballot can be
enforced as a formal legal obligation. And in every case, those who
fail to fully and properly exercise these “rights” would be subject to
whatever fines, penalties or punishments the state decides to impose.
Enforcement of such obligations would undoubtedly render
numerous social benefits. And just as with the “individual militia
right,” we could explain all of these things nicely as important aspects
of civic virtue, vital to a vibrant republican community. But it would
be a glaring absurdity to call any of these things rights.
V. A NOTE ABOUT COUNTING AND SOME LESSER-KNOWN
VERSIONS OF THE HOLLOW SECOND AMENDMENT
It is not entirely accurate to call the individual militia right version
2.0 of the attempt to empty the Second Amendment of content.
Counting the work of other historians and anti-Standard Model
theorists, it is in fact at least version 7.0 of the hollow Second
Amendment. The summaries below frame the “individual militia
right” within the context of its intellectual cohorts.
A. A Leading Historian Says the Second Amendment Means
Nothing at All
For a time, the moderately sophisticated skeptic would argue that
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution really
meant nothing at all. It is a startling claim about a provision of our
vaunted Bill of Rights. But in 1975, the American Bar Association
put it this way: “It is doubtful that the Founding Fathers had any
intent in mind with regard to the meaning of this Amendment.”74 A
similar view was advanced in 1995 by historian Gary Wills who, after
criticizing standard modelers, then had to explain what the Second
74. Ben R. Miller, The Legal Basis for Firearms Controls, 100 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
1052, 1052 (1975).
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Amendment actually meant. Wills claimed that it really was just a
clever ruse by Madison that actually had no real meaning:
Why, then, did Madison propose the Second Amendment? For the
same reason that he proposed the Third, against quartering troops
on the civilian population. That was a remnant of old royal attempts
to create a standing army by requisition of civilian facilities. It had
no real meaning in a government that is authorized to build
barracks, forts, and camps. But it was part of the anti-royal rhetoric
of freedom that had shown up, like the militia language, in state
requests for amendments to the Constitution. . . . Madison knew
that the best way to win acceptance of the new government was to
accommodate its critics on the matter of a bill of rights. . . . Madison
confided to a friend: “It will kill the opposition everywhere.” Sweettalking the militia was a small price to pay for such a coup . . . .75

Wills’ vision of the Second Amendment as a meaningless ruse
never really caught on with courts, which have strong traditions
against dismissing statutory and constitutional provisions as
meaningless.76 Its main appeal was to allow otherwise thoughtful
people to dismiss individual rights claims and the standard model for
another decade or so. As with the “individual militia right,” there
was minimal concern about establishing an affirmative account of the
Second Amendment.
B. The “Real” but “Secret” Meaning of the Second
Amendment
In a 1998 article entitled The Hidden History of the Second
Amendment, Professor Karl Bogus claimed that the Second
Amendment actually “was written to assure the Southern states that
Congress would not undermine the slave system by using its newly
acquired constitutional authority over the militia to disarm the state
militia and thereby destroy the South’s principal instrument of slave
control.”77 On this account, not only is the Second Amendment

75. Garry Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 21, 1995)
(emphasis
added),
available
at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
1995/sep/21/to-keep-and-bear-arms/.
76. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 324–26 (2009) (discussing “the
antisuperfluousness canon”).
77. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 309, 321 (1998).

JOHNSON_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

RIGHTS VERSUS DUTIES

2/14/2013 4:09 PM

1523

irrelevant in our modern world, it also deserves the same disdain as
other constitutional accommodations of slavery.78
C. A Narrow Definition of Militia Exposes the “Individual
Militia Right”
In an article from 2000, Professor Bogus also illustrates something
that should already be evident in the comparison between Stevens’s
dissent and the earlier work of the lower federal courts.79 The
weakness of the responses to the Standard Model is not just that there
are so many different ones. More so, the problem is that the
alternatives themselves are in conflict.
Reflecting an earlier
generation of opposition to the Standard Model, Bogus actually
underscores the core flaw of the supposed “individual militia right.”
Militia, says Bogus,
is defined in the Constitution itself. The founders disagreed about
how the militia ought to be organized. . . . However, they agreed as
a constitutional matter to leave this up to Congress. . . . Thus, the
militia is what Congress decides it is, regardless of whether it differs
from an eighteenth century model. Currently the militia is
indisputably the National Guard because Congress has so decided.80

Now compare Patrick Charles’s assessment that the individual
militia right articulates “the fact that individual citizens capable of

performing militia service had a right to take part in defending their
liberties.”81 Charles tries to make this sound something like a right
that can be exercised by anyone with the physical ability to serve.
Bogus, however, candidly acknowledges the point that fueled Scalia’s
critique that a right to participate in an organization over which
Congress has plenary authority is an absurdity.82 The militia, says
78. Id. (“In effect, the Second Amendment supplemented the slavery compromise
made at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and obliquely codified in
other constitutional provisions.”).
79. According to Stevens, “Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by
individuals.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). According to Tot and the many cases that follow it, “[The Second
Amendment] was not adopted with individual rights in mind, but as a protection for
the states in the maintenance of their militia organizations against possible
encroachments by the federal power.” United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir.
1942).
80. Carl T. Bogus, The History of Second Amendment Scholarship, in THE
SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY: HISTORIANS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARS ON THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 7 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000).
81. Charles, supra note 42, at 365 (emphasis added).
82. See supra notes 27–28, 80 and accompanying text.
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Bogus, is whatever Congress says it is—today the National Guard,
tomorrow nothing at all—revealing in a different way that the
“individual militia right” has no constitutionally protected content.83
D. Collective Rights: A Gloss on States’ Rights
Within the case law, some courts pressed the states’ rights view
discussed infra in Tot.84 But others took the view that the Second
Amendment was some sort of “collective right.”85 This approach
attempted to finesse the fact that the right extended to the “people,”
by saying that it established a “collective right of the militia . . .
limited to keeping and bearing arms, the possession or use of which
‘at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia . . . .’”86 In practical application,
this collective right extended to the people not as individuals, but as
an organized political group—i.e., the state.87
E. A Second Amendment Hollowed Out by
Neorepublicanism
In 1991, David Williams published in the Yale Law Journal yet
another rendition of the hollow Second Amendment. This time the
argument was grounded in republicanism:
Creating or maintaining a republic against the constant risk of
corruption by particularistic interests is therefore the most difficult
of tasks. Republican theory, however, offers some structures to aid
in this task, prominent among them the universal militia.
....
From this republican perspective, the error of those who today seek
to guarantee a private right to arms is that they would thereby
consign the means of force to those who happen to possess
firearms—a partial slice of society—rather than to the whole people
assembled in militia. . . . At a minimum, therefore, any modern
version of this militia must be so inclusive that its composition offers
some meaningful promise that it will not become the tool of a slice
of society, as it could in the case of those who decide for private
reasons to buy a gun or to become members of the national guard.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976).

Id.
See id.
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....
As we today have no such universal militia and no assurance that
contemporary arms-bearers will be virtuous, the Second
Amendment itself is—for now—outdated.88

Williams rendered the Second Amendment only temporarily
hollow, leaving the right to arms contingent on the revival of a kind of
virtuous citizenry to which presumably he would alert us, if it arose.
Until then, “the Amendment has little or no direct meaning for
judges.”89
F. A Prize Winning Historian Says American Gun Culture
(and Thus the Right to Arms) Is Myth
In 2000, to accolades and awards, historian Michael Bellesiles
attempted to empty the Second Amendment of content with the
claim that, historically, Americans never really owned many guns, and
thus by implication had no real expectation of a robust right to arms.90
Claims of an individual right to arms therefore could not be plausibly
rooted in history and were really just modern constructions of the gun
rights lobby.91 Bellesiles won the Bancroft prize (“considered one of
the most distinguished academic awards in the field of history”)92 for
the effort. Subsequently, it came to light that Bellesiles had
fabricated and misstated much of his data and his book was
withdrawn and pulped and his Bancroft prize rescinded.93 Gary Wills,
who had given the book a rave review in The New York Times, later
said that he and others were “taken” by Bellesiles.94“’. . . .” Individual
rights skeptics seemed to have abandoned the Bellesiles version of
the hollow Second Amendment.95
88. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 553–54 (1991).
89. Id. at 615.
90. See MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL GUN CULTURE 5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2000).
91. See id. at 13.
92. Winners of the Bancroft Prize Announced, COLUMBIA UNIV. LIBRARIES
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://library.columbia.edu/content/libraryweb/news/libraries/
2012/20120314_bancroftprize.html.
93. See JOHNSON, ET. AL., supra note 21, at 109-10.
94. In Depth with Garry Wills, C-SPAN VIDEO LIBRARY, at 2:05:30 (Jan. 2, 2005),
http://www.c-spanarchives.org/program/184749-1 (“After all, [Bellesiles’ book] had
been given a very prestigious award and the Judges were taken. . . . [H]e was a
practicing historian with good credentials up to that point.”).
95. Also contradicting Bellesilles’ claim about the lack of concern about a right to
arms is the basically continuous enshrinement of a right to arms in state constitutions
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G. The Tally
The definitive list of “Hollow Second Amendment” theories
remains to be completed and some may quarrel with my categories.
By my count, the “individual militia right” is at least version 7.0 of the
effort to flush any content from the “right of the people to keep and
bear arms”.
CONCLUSION
One wonders what Justice Stevens was thinking as he fashioned his
Did he
consider and dismiss other ways of rejecting a meaningful individual
right to arms? What did or would he answer, when asked for an
example of the individual militia right in operation? Would he tick
off a list of things that can only be understood as duties, rendering the
right empty, incoherent, and earning Scalia’s chide that the
proposition is “worthy of the [M]ad [H]atter?”96
Heller skeptics evidently are prepared to advance the “individual
militia right” as clearly the best reading of the Second Amendment.
This willingness to embrace a view so inherently vexing and devoid of
content brings to mind the comment of a partisan pundit in one of the
recent campaigns. Confessing to an unhealthy bias against one of the
candidates, the talking head admitted that if the alternative were
Daffy Duck, then Daffy Duck was his man.
The opposition to the individual right to arms is similar. The initial
attempt to empty the Second Amendment of content required one to
believe that “right of the people” really meant “right of the states.”
Numerous lesser efforts followed.
The currently preferred
alternative—version six, seven, eight, or perhaps higher, depending
on how you count—transforms a duty into an “individual militia
right” that has no characteristics of a right and yields nothing that is
enforceable as a right. How many tries are allowed before the
enterprise loses credibility?

Heller dissent to advance the “individual militia right.”

and the colonial arms laws that actually required firearms ownership. See JOHNSON,
supra note 21, at 101-10.
96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 589 (2008) (“The right to
carry arms in the militia for the purpose of killing game is worthy of the mad hatter.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

ET. AL.,

